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Casenote

Liberating the Library: Fair Use Mostly
Upheld for University E-Reserves in
Cambridge University Press v. Becker

I.

INTRODUCTION

Libraries and universities across the country had Georgia on their
minds as they waited in anticipation for over a year for the outcome of
a case.before the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia. On May 11, 2012, in Cambridge University Press v. Becker,'
Judge Orinda Evans answered a question of vital importance to
librarians and university officials ever since the passage of the Copyright
Act of 1976: does copyright infringement occur if a nonprofit institution

1. 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
2. U.S.C. tit. 17, ch. 1-8 (2006). Although Congress enacted a Copyright Act in 1909,
with the dawn of new technologies, the necessity for an updated copyright scheme became
abundantly clear. Therefore, in 1976 the current Copyright Act was codified. Furthermore,
the equitable judge-made doctrine of fair use was codified for the first time in § 107 of the
Act. Although there are specified uses that are deemed not to infringe on copyright, one
of which is educational copying for classroom use, the United States Supreme Court still
tended to examine and weigh all four factors listed in the Act in determining fair use.
Possibly because of the wording in the preamble, it was still unsettled law whether a
university library could copy and distribute copyrighted works under fair use-that is, until
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makes copies for the classroom for a nonprofit educational purpose? In
a 350-page opinion, the court answered with a powerful, yet qualified,
no.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The President of Georgia State University (GSU), as well as other
GSU officials, including the Board of Regents, were sued by a triumvirate of academic publishers-Cambridge University Press, Oxford
University Press, and Sage Publications-for over seventy-five copyright
infringements under 17 U.S.C. § 101. 3 The plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities under Ex parte Young 4 and sought
injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees.5 The defendants answered by
denying infringement and claiming fair use and sovereign immunity.'
In response, GSU issued a new "Copyright Policy" that required
professors to fill out a fair use checklist7 when posting to GSU's ereserves (ERES).' In November 2010, the court agreed that only
infringements post-dating the new policy were appropriate for relief.'
The plaintiffs filed ninety-nine claims of copyright infringement, later
reduced
to seventy-five, all of which the defendants claimed were fair
0
use.

this exact scenario was examined for the first time in Cambridge. See generally Matthew
Sag, The Prehistoryof Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REv. 1371 (2011); ROGER E. SCHECHTER &
JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND

TRADEMARKS § 2.2.5, §§ 10.1-10.7 (2003).

3. U.S.C. tit. 17 ch. 1-8 (2006).
4. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young was a case brought by railroad stockholders
against the Minnesota Attorney General for attempting to enforce a state railway rates

statute and presented a situation where the Court noted that there was "ample
justification" to build a narrow exception to state immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 155-56. See generally John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 994-95 (2008) (discussing the reasoning and purposes of the Ex parte Young

exception).
5.

Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.

6. Id.
7. It was noted at trial that GSU's copyright policy labeled up to 15% of a work to be
copied as "likely safe" and 10% as "really safe" under fair use. Id. at 1201-02.
8. Id. at 1202. GSU professors were encouraged to participate in training to learn how
to request e-materials and how to properly fill out the fair use checklist for ERES.
Students were only given restricted access for the current semester enrolled. The excerpts

copied were sometimes optional and sometimes required reading. None of the excerpts
were fiction. All the excerpts copied were for upper/graduate level social science or
language classes and were intended to supplement the class reading. Id. at 1218-21.
9. Id. at 1203.
10. Id. at 1203-04. GSU also objected to the plaintiffs' calculations for the total pages
of work and entered its own average percentage of work used as 9.6%. The court would
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Trial began on May 17, 2011, where it became clear that the plaintiffs
were funded by the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC).' CCC is a
permissions company that licenses out copyrighted works and pays a
percentage of its revenues to the publisher, a small amount of which is
2
paid in royalties to authors, but not to contributing authors. Interestingly, the court found that many of the allegedly infringed works were
not covered by CCC's licensing agreement; however, CCC did license
most of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. 3 The court's fair use analysis
gave import to these facts, as will be seen below.
Fearing the worst and hoping for the best, libraries were given a
mixed blessing when Judge Evans ruled mostly against the academic
publishers and for GSU and its e-reserves. The court held that although
the defendants could be liable under Exparte Young, the defendants had
14
a valid fair-use defense in all but five of the claims before the court.
Of course, this frustrated the publishers (and their supporters) who were
looking to have the 1976 Classroom Guidelines upheld at the very
least. 15 Thus, on September 12, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an appeal

later calculate the average to be 10.1%. Id. at 1218.
11. Id. at 1204, 1212-13. The American Association of Publishers (AAP) also
contributed to the funding of the publishers' case. The CCC has a"burgeoning permissions
business" of which the plaintiffs, as publishers, are clients.
12. Id. at 1212-13. In total, CCC pays each of the plaintiffs on average around
$1,000,000 a year, but with respect to educational licenses, the amount is closer to $75,000
per year for each plaintiff. Id. at 1216.
13. Id. at 1213-16. The court also found that many of the copyrights, especially those
written by authors in collected anthologies, were not even owned by the plaintiffs.
14. Id. at 1363-64.
15. Id. at 1227-28. The Classroom Guidelines emerged out of negotiations surrounding
the Copyright Act between educators and publishers on what would constitute a safe
harbor for educational copying of copyrighted materials. The negotiations focused on three
categories, which were intended to be the bare minimum of what was fair use for
educational purposes: brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect. Id. To meet the test of
brevity, the amount copied of a prose work may be a "complete article, story or essay of less
than 2,500 words, or... an excerpt from any prose work of not more than 1,000 words or
10% of the work, whichever is less." Copyrights Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 2541) 5682 [hereinafter Copyrights Act]. To meet the test of
spontaneity, the decision to use the work and the moment when it is used must be "so close
in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission."
Id. Under the cumulative effect test, the copies should be "for only one course... [and]
[nio[ ]more than ... two excerpts may be copied from the same author, nor more than
three from the same collective work ... during one class term," and a teacher may not
have more than nine instances of such copying for one course. Id. at 5683. Also, the
Guidelines state a general prohibition, that copying shall not "substitute for the purchase
of books, publishers' reprints or periodicals" nor "be repeated with respect to the same item
by the same teacher from term to term." Id. However, no part of the guidelines made it
into the fair use section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. See generally Jessica D. Litman,
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with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The
matter is currently awaiting adjudication before that court.
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Copyright Infringement and FairUse

Copyright law is the exclusive domain of the federal government,
falling under the purview of the Constitution's Article I power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 6 However, it was
not until the Copyright Act of 1976 that Congress established what
constituted copyright infringement and codified factors to determine a
valid "fair use" of copyrighted material.17 According to the Act, a work
is copyrighted if it is an "original work[] of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression."18 Although "[olriginality remains the
sine qua non of copyright," 9 the threshold for originality is low, and all
that is needed is a work that displays some "minimal degree of
creativity."2" The United States Supreme Court has noted that where
a copyright registration is required under 17 U.S.C. § 411, this element
must likewise be established to show infringement.2' Therefore, all
that is needed to show copyright infringement is that the work is
original, the claimant owns the copyright, and the work was copied.22
However, that does not mean all copying of an original work is
prohibited, especially if fair use is properly asserted.
Fair use was first articulated in 1841 by Justice Story in his factor
analysis of a claim against a biography of George Washington.2 3 The

Copyright, Compromise, and LegislativeHistory, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987).
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107.
18. Id. § 102.
19. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (holding that
the direct reproduction of materials in another telephone book was not a copyright infringement).
20. Id.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (providing that in certain circumstances it may be necessary for
a copyright holder to register a copyright to demonstrate ownership); see Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1246-47 (2010).
22. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; accord SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding a parody of the novel Gone with the Wind sufficiently
transformative to be deemed fair use).
23. Although Justice Story did not label his balancing test fair use, he did lay the
foundation for the factor analysis that was codified in 1976:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
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four-factor framework of fair use has changed little since Story's time,
and Congress merely codified the defense in § 107 of the Copyright
Generally, fair use is seen as a flexible doctrine meant to
Act.'
balance the promotion of innovation and progress with the "rigid
application of the copyright statute," which has the potential to "stifle
25
the very creativity which the law is designed to foster." The types of
use that fall under § 107 include "such use by reproduction in copies...
for purposes such as ... teaching (including multiple copies for

classroom use), scholarship, or research." 6 Once it is established that
the use falls into one of the preamble's so-called productive categories,
the court additionally evaluates whether the alleged infringement falls
under fair use by looking at the four factors codified in § 107:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
In attempting to clarify the balancing requirement for fair use analysis,
the Supreme Court has noted that all four factors "are to be explored,
and the results weighed together"28 and that any presumptive bright
line categories should be avoided.29
In two seminal cases, the Supreme Court laid out a framework for
evaluating fair use. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,° the Court held that direct quotes from President Ford's
unpublished memoir printed without his permission did not fall under
fair use.3 ' However, the Court held that a rap parody of the Roy

supersede the objects, of the original work. Many mixed ingredients enter into the
discussion of such questions.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (quoting and discussing Justice Story's synopsis of the
factors necessary to determine fair use).
24. Copyrights Act, supra note 15, at 5679; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
25. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
27. Id.
28. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
29. Id. at 584.
30. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
31. Id. at 549. The Court evaluated all four factors of fair use under the lens that the
memoir was yet unpublished, thus affecting the author's "right of first publication." Id.at
552.
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Orbison song "Oh, Pretty Woman" may be subject to fair use in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.82 In these cases, the Court made
clear that all the factors should be weighed, and no factor should be
"simplified with bright-line rules."33 Furthermore, a powerful
category
known as transformative use emerged-that is, creating something new
with a further purpose or different character.34 A transformative use
of a work is likely to be deemed fair use even if it is a copy, because it
is not likely to supplant the original in the marketplace. 35 However,
where a copy is verbatim or takes "the heart of the original," and is thus
unlikely to be deemed transformative, these facts will weigh heavily
against fair use.36
Since Campbell, circuit courts have tried to determine the proper
weight to give the factors. Where some circuits have found educational
copying in the commercial arena not to be fair use due to market
effect,37 other cases have moved away from a commercial/market
approach and have emphasized a transformative analysis. 38 However,

32. 510 U.S. at 594.
33. Id. at 577.
34. Examining the first factor, the Court did not find the argument that the article was
"news," and thus educational, to be convincing under a fair-use analysis, because the
Nation itself said it was "scooping" Time magazine. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
Later, in Campbell, the court concluded that even commercial use that is transformative
would not necessarily preclude a determination of fair use, thus implying that a nonprofit
transformative use would almost certainly be deemed fair use. 510 U.S. at 579.
35. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 562, 565, 568 (noting that the court may have come
to a different analysis if it had been a "nonprofit" organization, but because the quotes were
verbatim and a "substantial portion" of the original work, it weighed against fair use not
only on the first and third factor, but also on the fourth factor, because it "directly
competed for a share of the market").
36. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587-89 (noting that taking a quantitative and qualitative
amount would not be dispositive to fair use if the work could be shown to be transformative
and thus not supplanting the market share).
37. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389
(6th Cir. 1996) (noting "[wle need not decide [the status of nonprofit uses], however, for the
fact is that the copying complained of here was performed on a profit-making basis by a
commercial enterprise"); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding the copying of magazines was not fair use where licenses could be purchased);
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding
course packets created and sold by Kinko's were not fair use). These cases are relied upon
for the heavy market analysis in Judge Evans's opinion in Cambridge.
38. See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1271 (determining that substantial copying of a novel
was valid if put to a transformative purpose); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley,
448 F.3d 605,609-10 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that re-contextualization can be transformative
even if there is no modification of the original); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir.
2006) (noting that copying to create a new work of sculpture, even without critical purpose,
could still be transformative); Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, No. C 07-
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there is no definitive precedent on how all four of the factors should be
applied across the board, let alone when copyrighted works are copied
by a nonprofit university for a nonprofit educational use. Therefore,
Cambridge is a pivotal litmus test for fair use in this unexplored area.
Suing State Officials and the Ex parte Young Exception
Ex parte Young presents a narrow exception to the Eleventh Amendment that arises where a suit seeks injunctive relief against a state actor
who is infringing on a constitutionally guaranteed right or federal
law.39 According to the Court, a proper Ex Parte Young analysis is
straightforward and it "does not include an analysis of the merits of the
claim."4 ° Rather, it only requires "[a]n allegation of an ongoing
violation of federal law" and the seeking of prospective injunctive
relief.4 Although the analysis is held to be straightforward, the circuit
courts have debated the necessary connection between the official's
such a suit.42
duties and the violation of federal law that would allow
In particular, the circuit courts have asked whether it is enough that the
43
officials are "responsible for administering the system" or whether
they must actually take steps to violate federal law.' The court in
the question of
Cambridge likewise examined the exception through
45
suit.
bring
to
nexus"
"sufficient
a
was
whether there
B.

6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (stating that copying of antiIslamic statement without modification was transformative).
39. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 159. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,
438-39 (2004) (holding that the federal government has the right to proscribe action by the
state where a state has consented to uphold a federal law and has failed to perform the
necessary steps to do so, whether or not those actions are explicitly in the statute or not);
see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (noting
that the Ex parte Young exception is valid not only where a state actor violates a citizen's
constitutional guarantees, but also where a state actor acts inconsistently with federal law).
40. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 646.
41. Id. (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Ohio, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997)).
42. See Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633
F.3d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); William v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d
1282, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2007). In both cases the University of Georgia (UGA) and the
Board of Regents were sued, first for copyright and patent infringement and second, under
a § 1983 sexual harassment claim. However, in both cases the court assumed that the
Board of Regents and UGA were state officials for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Thus,
the court ignored the "connection" analysis under Ex parte Young and held that in a suit
against state officials and where immunity has not been abrogated, the suit is barred. See
generally Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing various tests
applied in determining the Ex parte Young exception among the circuit courts).
43. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1016 (11th Cir. 1988).
44. Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Prod. Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1342-43 (2006).
45. 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
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CouRT's RATIONALE

A. Copyright Infringement and Fair Use Factors:Judge Evans's Line
is Looking Pretty Bright
In analyzing the seventy-five copyright infringement claims, the court
established an analytical framework in which it viewed each claim.
First, the court established what each claim must prove for a prima facie
case of copyright infringement.46 Second, it looked at how it was going
to weigh all four factors of § 107.4'
1. Was There Even a Prima Facie Case? Plaintiffs bear the
burden of proving a claim of infringement under the Copyright Act. 48
In order to maintain a prima facie claim, the court asserted that
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they 1) own the copyright of the
allegedly infringed-upon books and 2) that the defendant actually "copied
protected elements" of those books.49 Judge Evans also cited the
criteria of originality and the necessity of a copyright registration. s °
Although the court found that all seventy-five works had been copied, it
noted that in sixty-four of the works, the plaintiffs' ownership of the
copyright had not been established.5 1 Although Sage Publications
argued that it considered the editors to be the authors, the court did not
agree.52 Thus, the court found that where there is no contract with a
contributing author in evidence, the result will be "fatal to Plaintiffs'
prima facie case." 3 Likewise, the court noted that where the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate an assignation of licenses, their infringement
claims also failed.54 Finally, the court found that in many of the
claims, no student had ever read the excerpts on e-reserve; this was
deemed de minimis use, and such claims failed.55

46. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
47. Id. at 1224-39.
48. Id. at 1221.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The plaintiffs had particular difficulty in establishing ownership of licenses for
chapters within edited works. This was because the publishers did not have contracts with
the contributing authors, but only with the general editors of the work.
52. Id. at 1222-23.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1245.
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2. Fair Use and its Four Factors. GSU and its officials asserted
56 The court took a
a fair-use defense to all the infringement claims.
unique perspective in its extremely fact-intensive approach in determining the validity of GSU's defense, as will be further examined below.
The court looked to the § 107 factors in defining the criteria of fair use,
5
and it noted that all four factors must be weighed together. " 5 Finally,
" would
Inc.
Music,
the court made clear that Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
59
guide the analysis.
use, and the court
Factor 1 looks to the character and purpose of6the
° In coming to that
asserted that this factor "favors [d]efendants."
conclusion, the court took a plain language reading of the preamble of
§ 107, noting that GSU's copying was for "strictly nonprofit educational
purposes."' Although the court noted that a "nonprofit educational
purpose does not automatically ensure fair use," it does weigh in its
favor. 62 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that
this case is similar to the cases that found commercial course-pack
63
copying to be an infringement. It also found GSU's use distinguishable from a case that involved a for-profit institution copying for
the plaintiffs'
research and scientific use.64 Likewise, the court rejected
65 However, the
argument that the first factor weighed in their favor.
court avoided a transformative use analysis, finding that Campbell ruled
"straight reproduction" for the classroom was an exception to the

56. Id. at 1223.
57. Id. at 1224-39.
58. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
59. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. It should be noted that in many respects the
court deviated from Campbell, in both its transformative analysis, as well as the Court's
imperative to avoid bright-line simplifications. See supra note 36. In fact, even Justice
Story suggested that "[wihen it comes to a question of quantity, it must be very vague."
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
60. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. The Second Circuit has similarly found that
the first factor leans towards the defendants when the copying is done for criticism or
academic scholarship. See NXIVM v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) ("there
is a strong presumption that factor one favors the defendant if the allegedly infringing
work fits the description of uses described in § 107"); see also Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 2012 WL 4808939 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (fmding the copying of materials for a
library database transformative). HathiTrust is a digital database established by a
consortium of University Research Libraries in partnership with Google to digitize and
make electronically available printed works.
61. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
62. Id. at 1225.

63. See supra note 37.
64. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d at 921.
65.

Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
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emphasis on transformation, and as such the e-reserve excerpts favored
a finding of fair use.66
Factor 2 examines the nature of the copyrighted works. The court
determined that the copied works were "factual in nature," thus favoring
fair use and the defendants.67 The court found that academic books,
because of their informative nature, relinquished a large degree of
copyright protection.6 8 Judge Evans found the more "creative" a work,
the more protection against copying should be afforded it.69 Therefore,
although the court noted the amount of effort required to create the
"high quality ... scholarship" of an academic work, it rejected the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine as inconsistent with the underlying principles of
copyright. 70 In so doing, the court found that fact-based books have a
"greater public value" and therefore justified that use of academic/scholarly books should be more broadly tolerated under fair use.7'
Factor 3 assesses the amount and substantiality of the copied work
and its relation to the whole. The court found this factor could favor
either the plaintiffs (if the copied work was over 10% of a less-than-ten
chapter book or one chapter of an over-ten chapter book) or ten
defendants (if it fell under the 10% or one-chapter use ratio).72
However, in this case the ratio set up by the court tended to favor the
defendants.73 The court took a bold approach by setting the bright-line
ratio, which strongly defined what constituted fair use.74 Looking to
the Classroom Guidelines,75 the plaintiffs wished to enforce its three
main criteria: brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect.76 However,
the court rejected this argument as reading into legislative history
unnecessarily, noting that § 107 is "not ambiguous" and should be read
plainly.7 7 The court then focused its analysis on what constituted a

66. Id. at 1224 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11).
67. Id. at 1227.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1225.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1226 (quoting Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533).
72. Id. at 1227, 1235. The court noted that in determining this ratio one must divide
the number of pages in the copied excerpt by the number of pages in the book. Id. at 1243.
73. Id. at 1363-64 (finding no infringement except in five cases).
74. Id. at 1226-28.
75. See supra note 15.
76. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
77. Id. at 1229. This statement is a bit ironic about a code section that is evoking a
350-page opinion from the court in justification of its analysis of this so-called "unambiguous" statute. Fair use is notoriously complicated; even the court in Kinko's, a case that
Judge Evans heavily relied upon in her analysis, noted, "Courts and commentators
disagree on the interpretation and application of the four factors .... " Kinko's, 758 F.
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reasonable amount of copying in relation to the whole, and addressed
two issues: what is the whole of the work, and how much of that work
can be copied under fair use?7"
Disagreeing with the plaintiffs' argument that the number of pages
only constituted the text of the work, the court asserted that all written
work comprised the whole, especially where the pages are numbered
The court flatly
(including dedications, forewords, and indices).7"
of a compiled,
chapter
each
that
claim
plaintiffs'
the
untimely
as
rejected
unto itself."
work
a
comprised
authors
different
by
edited work written
use of a
fair
constitutes
what
in
determining
that
noted
The court
small."5 '
"sufficiently
be
to
need
would
amount
mirror-image copy, the
Looking at cases dealing with for-profit copying of course packets, the
court found that smaller amounts copied correlated with findings of fair
use.8 2 The court identified the typical range for universities and
determined that the average 10.1% amount of copying done by GSU was
a conservative amount of use." Furthermore, the court noted that in
regards to the quality or substantiality of GSU's copying, it was not
aimed at stealing "the heart of the book" but rather focused on filling a
"need" or gap in the course curriculum." Thus, the court encouraged
the application of a test which would look at whether the copied excerpt
went to a legitimate purpose in the course and whether it was narrowly
tailored to accomplish that purpose." Finally, the court highlighted

Supp. at 1530. See also Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433,
433 (2008) (labeling fair use "the great white whale of American copyright law," both

"[eInthralling [and] enigmatic"); Michael W. Carroll, FixingFairUse, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087,
1092-1122 (2007) (displaying the inconsistency ofjudicial interpretations of fair use); David
Nimmer, "Fairestof Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS., 263, 280 (proposing that if Congress had "legislated a dartboard," it would have
been just as effective as the factors, further asserting the pliability of the four factors).

78. The court also found that any amount of copying that can be described as de
minimis was not an infringement. In other words, if a student never looked at the copy,
there was no harm done. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.

79. Id. at 1229-30.
80. Id. at 1230-32. Although the plaintiffs asserted the holding in Texaco, likening

edited book chapters to a journal article, the court distinguished this case from that holding

by noting that the article's copyright in that case was assigned to the publishers by the
individual authors. Id. at 1231.
81. Id. at 1232.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1233.
85. Id. Again, the plaintiffs asserted that copying a whole chapter in an edited
/compiled work by different authors would be taking the whole of that author's work. Id.
at 1229-30. However, the court notes that in the course-pack cases the authors had already
relinquished their rights of copyright to the publisher, and thus the publisher owned the
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that the amount used must be viewed within the context of "promoting
the spread of knowledge," and the limit should not be so restrictive as
to stifle that ultimate constitutional purpose.8 6
Factor 4 deals with money, potential loss of revenue in the marketplace, and loss of value of the work as a whole. Where there is harm,
the factor "heavily" favors the plaintiffs, but where there is no market
effect, it favors the defendants.87 Thus, the question turned on whether
the copied excerpts would lead to market "substitution," supplanting the
original and thus directly affecting its value.88 The court answered
with a decisive no, finding that 10% of an original can never substitute
for the whole. 9 However, where a license is "reasonably available, at
a reasonable price" and not purchased, then it would impact the value
of the book's copyright." The court then proceeded to shift the burden
to the plaintiffs to prove that licenses from CCC were reasonably
available, deviating from the Campbell standard.9 1 Furthermore, the
court noted that it was not sufficient to have licenses merely available
for photocopies; the licenses must be available for "digitalcopies" to fall
under the reasonableness standard, and where there was no evidence of
such a license, there was likewise no harm.92
Finally, the court presented three additional factors to consider outside
of the statutory four-factor framework: Would the copying deter
academics from creating new works? Would the copying diminish the
plaintiffs' ability to publish? And, finally, would the copying promote the
spread of knowledge? To the first two questions, the court answered
no. 93 Academic authors, the court noted, generally publish for reasons
other than income from their books, especially contributing authors in
an edited work-who receive no royalties.94 Therefore, the scholars
would not lose incentive or stop publishing just because their informacopyright to the edited work as a whole. Id. Therefore, to claim that copying a chapter is
copying a whole of a work would merely result in the stifling of the dissemination of that
chapter's knowledge without adding any further protection to the author himself and
therefore adding no greater incentive to create new works. Id. at 1234.
86. Id. at 1234-35.
87. Id. at 1235-36, 1239.
88. Id. at 1236.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1237 (agreeing with the Texaco court that where a license is readily available,
it should be purchased; if not, there is potential market harm).
91. Id. The court noted that the lack of evidence on whether a license was available
for digital copies was a major gap in the plaintiffs' argument. Id. at 1238.
92. Id. at 1238. In all the claims presented, the court found that only thirteen could
demonstrate a license. Id.
93. Id. at 1240.
94. Id.
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tion was being copied and distributed within the academic community.95 Furthermore, the court noted that any major effect, such as being
forced out of business by such copying, was "speculative" and "unsupported," especially when considering that the permissions revenue was
merely a fraction of 1% of their total income, and the nonprofit6
educational purposes were only a small fraction of that number.
Therefore, the lack of substantial economic harm, when weighed against
the import given in the Constitution to the spread of knowledge and
learning, strongly favored fair use by the defendants."
In conclusion, the court proceeded to examine all seventy-five claims
under the framework established above. In all but five cases, the court
found that either the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case or
that there was valid fair use-a 9decisive win for GSU and libraries
across the country with e-reserves. "
B. A Quick Note on Ex parte Young
The court would not have proceeded to the merits of the case if it had
not found an Ex parte Young exception valid. In coming to this finding,
the court rested on Eleventh Circuit precedents as well as "the Supreme
Court's continuing commitment to protecting federally guaranteed
Therefore, Judge Evans barred Eleventh Amendment
rights."9
immunity to the defendants."' The court noted the standard of Ex
parte Young was appropriate because where an official violates federal
1 1
laws, the cloak of immunity falls away." However, the defendants
countered by stating that the GSU officials "only oversee" the policies
1 2 The court
and did not actually violate federal law themselves.
recognized that the GSU officials did not actually "personally participate
0 3 However, the
in individual fair use decisions or make any copies."
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1241. In fact, the court noted that even if the permissions income had not
been received, Oxford and Cambridge Press would have still been comfortably "in the
black," and, therefore, the court reasoned it did not threaten the existence of the
publishers' business. Id.
97. Id. at 1240-42.
98. Id. at 1364.
99. Id. at 1209. The court relied on Luckey in deciding whether the Eleventh
Amendment barred suit, and the court cited not only the Supreme Court's precedent, but
also the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Williams v. Board of Regents, noting that "state
officials sued in their official capacities ... are state actors" and therefore fall under
sovereign immunity. Id. at 1205.
100. Id. at 1210.
101. Id. at 1209-10.
102. Id. at 1206.
103. Id. at 1209.
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court found itself bound by the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in
Luckey v. Harris,10 4 finding the GSU officials' connection was sufficient
where, like the governor and judges in Luckey, the defendants "were
responsible for the creation and implementation of the 2009 Copyright
Policy."0 5 Thus, following the Supreme Court's "'straightforward inquiry,'" the court saw ample justification for extending Ex parte Young
here, and likewise raised the specter that state university officials may
be held liable for their institutions' copyright policies."°
V. IMPLICATIONS

Cambridge is groundbreaking because it is the first case to deal with
digital copying by a nonprofit university for nonprofit educational
purposes. Although the case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, there
remains a question of whether Judge Evans's opinion will remain intact,
especially in regards to the lack of transformative analysis and the
bright-line ratio. Even still, universities and libraries will continue to
look to Cambridge as strong, positive, persuasive authority when sued
or when creating guidelines for fair use. However, CCC and the
publishers remain disappointed and are anxiously hoping for a more
favorable analysis from the Eleventh Circuit.' 7 Conversely, GSU and
libraries with e-reserves across the country feel that they have won a
victory, even if a qualified one.'0 8
Interestingly, it should be noted that the court of appeals could hold
that the case is merely barred under Ex parte Young, leaving the lower
court's factor analysis intact as a point of copyright interest. 19 Of
course, that would be a fascinating outcome and a great victory to other
universities who could freely pursue their e-reserve policies under the
cloak of sovereign immunity. However, considering that the GSU
officials did take an active role in creating new copyright policy and the
publishers only sought injunctive relief, it is likely the court will hear
the case on the merits.

104. 860 F.2d 1012 (lth Cir. 1988).
105. Cambridge,863 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
106. Id. (quoting Verizon, 535 U.S. at 636).
107. Jennifer Howard, Publishers and Georgia State See Broad Implications in
CopyrightRuling, Chron. Higher Educ., (May 14, 2012), available at http://chronicle.com/
article/PublishersGeorgia-State/131876/.
108. Id.
109. See HathiTrust,2012 WL 4808939, at *5 (noting that an association lacks standing
to bring a claim of copyright infringement on behalf of its members); Ass'n for Info. Media
& Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. CV 10-9378 CBM, 2011 WL 7447148, at *4-6

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (dismissing the case on grounds of sovereign immunity and lack
of standing while also emphasizing the fair use defense).
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On appeal, fair use is treated as a mixed question of fact and law;
therefore, the factors can be reweighed by the court,110 and it is likely
that the court of appeals will do just that. However, given the most
recent cases involving university copying, it is hard to imagine a less
Scholars have already begun
favorable outcome for the universities.'
to assert that Cambridge's precedent, along with the recent ruling
involving libraries' use of Google for digitizing copies of whole books in
New York, Authors Guild Inc. v. HathiTrust,"2 displays a powerful
shift "in attitudes about fair use," stating that these cases will likely be
considered "landmark and watershed" cases." 3 Interestingly, the
publishers and license companies, who are currently despondent about
the results in Cambridge, might want to push the more moderate
opinion of Judge Evans over the recent HathiTrust opinion, which was
arguably an unmitigated victory for libraries."' What distinguishes
Judge Evans's opinion from Judge Baer's opinion in Hathirust,and
what was particularly unnerving to the libraries, was the factor one
analysis on the issue of transformative use and its subsequent effect on
the analyses and substantial weight given to the other three factors." 5

110. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (holding that fair use is a mixed question of fact
and law, so long as the record is sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,
allowing a court to reweigh on appeal the inferences to be drawn from that record).
111. HathiTrust, 2012 WL 4808939, at *12 (finding the copying of an entire text in
collaboration with Google for a digital library database to be transformative and thus fair
use); Aas'n for Info. Media & Equip, 2011 WL 7447148, at *6 (flinding that live streaming
of educational films by UCLA was likely fair use).
112. 2012 WL 4808939.
113. Steve Kolowich, A Legal Sweep, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 12, 2012), available
athttp/www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/f2/hathitrust-ruing-universities-fair-usewinning-streak (quoting Peter Decherney, an historian of copyright litigation at University
of Pennsylvania).
114. HathiTrust,2012 WL 4808939, at *14. In defense of his decision to dismiss the
claim, Judge Baer said, "I cannot imagine a definition of fair use that would not encompass
the transformative uses made by Defendants' [mass digitization project] and would require
that I terminate this invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of
the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the ADA." Id.
115. Judge Baer in HathiTrustemphasized the first factor of the analysis as weighing
heavily in HathiTrust's favor, noting that not only was the copying transformative, because
digital copies allowed for the ability to search the documents, but it was also transformative in its manner of use which was directed at allowing handicapped people to access the
written word in ways never imagined by the original work. 2012 WL 4808939, at *12-14.
Interestingly, another finding, noted above, was converse to Judge Evans's opinion in
Cambridge: because the association did not own the licenses, they lacked standing to
represent the authors in suit. Id. at *5. Standing was not considered by Judge Evans;
however, in the prima facie analysis, the lack of evidence of license ownership was argued
as a primary reason to dismiss many of the claims brought by Cambridge and Oxford
University Press. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
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Factor 1: Not Transformative, Really? Probably the most
surprising finding to emerge from Judge Evans's analysis is that copying
a digital excerpt for a course e-reserve was not transformative."'
Transformation has recently been emphasized by scholars as a powerfully important finding for fair use, because it eliminates the need to
quantify the use in the factor three analysis, and it weighs against any
finding of market effect in factor four (because when a work is found to
be transformative, it is unlikely to supplant the original in the marketplace).," Judge Evans ignored the possible transformative use of an ereserve digital copy and found that the copies made were an exception
to the finding of transformation.1 ' This analysis remains a disappointing aspect of Judge Evans's opinion for libraries because they had felt
that their use, although a mirror-image copy, was transformative.119
Even though Judge Evans found the first factor to weigh in the
defendants' favor, it meant that the rest of the factors would not
automatically weigh positively for the library, as would have been the
case if Judge Evans had found the e-reserve copying transformative.
A clear implication of Cambridge is that in the future, libraries will
not be able to buttress their factor analysis on a finding of transforma-

116. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphasizing the importance of allowing use that is
transformative). See generally PATRICIA AUFERHEIDE & PETER JASzI, RECLAIMING FAIR
USE: How To PuT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011); contra 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A] [1] [b],
at 13-168 (2011) ( "[cases] appear
to label a use 'not transformative' as a shorthand for 'not fair,' and correlatively
'transformative' for Tair"). Nimmer basically argues that transformation and fair use are
synonymous and transformation is used merely as a tool to justify a desired finding of fair
use.
117. Matthew Sag, PredictingFair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012) (arguing that the
most important factors in predicting a finding of fair use are transformative use, change
in the medium of the work, i.e., a creative shift, and how much is copied); see also Kevin
L. Smith, Why Are Some Publishers So Wrong About Fair Use? Peer to Peer Review,
LIBRARY J. (Oct. 18, 2012), http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2012/10/opinion/peer-to-peer
review/why-are-some-publishers-so-wrong-about-fair-use-peer-to-peer-review/#;
Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 768 (2011)
(looking at fair use cases decided between 1978 and 2011, he emphasizes the importance
of the transformative purpose, concluding that "the key question" is whether the use is
transformative, and, if so, whether the amount taken is appropriate to the transformative
purpose).
118. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. However, in Hathitrust,Judge Baer found
the copying by the libraries to be transformative, and he justified this transformation
analysis by the fact that even an exact copy can be put to a new use, such as superior
search capabilities and access to ADA protected individuals. 2012 WL 4808939, at *11.
119. ARL Policy Notes, ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES.ORG, (Nov. 4, 2012),
availableat http://policynotes.arl.org/post/24061943604/.
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tive use. Judge Evans's findings are a stark contrast to HathiTrust,
which found that copying whole books and placing them into a digital
database was transformative. 2 ° Thus, the lack of a finding of transformation may end up being the most controversial part of the Cambridge
decision and, if left intact, will be a marked diversion from where
libraries and scholars thought fair use was headed.' 2 ' On the other
hand, if the court of appeals was to ultimately hold the e-reserve copies
to be transformative, which is more in line with Judge Baer's analysis
in Hathitrust,this would mean a clear and decisive loss to publishers.
An additional implication is that because Judge Evans evaded the
transformation question, she proceeded with a thorough analysis of the
remaining three factors, and creating fascinating persuasive authority
for future analogous cases for both publishers and libraries alike.
Factor 2: No Surprise: Academic Works=Fair Use Judge Evans's
analysis of the second factor is in line with most cases, which hold that
when the nature of the work is factual a finding of fair use is likely.'22
The reason given for this argument is that an academic's incentive for
writing is not revenue, and thus protection is not necessary for continued
production.' 2 ' Justice Richard Posner has pointed out that academic
works by their nature are not written to make profit but rather for
prestige and the dissemination of knowledge; Judge Evans agreed.12 4

120. See supra note 118 onHathiTrust;see also Memorandum from Bernard J. Knight,
General Counsel for the United States Patent and Trademark Office regarding USPTO
Position on Fair Use of Copies of NPL Made in Patent Examination 1, 5 (Jan. 19, 2012),
available at httpv/www.uspto.gov/aboutoffices/ogc/USPTOPositiononFairUse-ofCopi

esofNPLMadeinPatentExamination.pdf; (asserting that the copying of an article can be
transformative when used for a "new and different purpose than that for which it was
created").
121. It should be highlighted that the Eleventh Circuit is a powerful contributor to the
canon of transformative use analysis, and it will be fascinating to see how it deals with the
first factor of Cambridge on appeal. See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1271 (noting the "more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors," such as
market effect) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
122. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (noting "some works are closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than others"); Feist,499 U.S. at 359; Koons, 467 F.3d 256 (2d
Cir. 2006); Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
123. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
124. Richard Posner, Do Patent and CopyrightLaw Restrict Competitionand Creativity
Excessively?, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity
excessively-posner.html (asserting "academic books and articles (apart from textbooks)...
are produced as a by product of academic research that the author must conduct in order
to preserve his professional reputation and that would continue to be produced even if not
copyrightable at all").
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Although this analysis has been advocated and will likely continue to be
advocated in the future, especially because of rhetoric emerging from the
Supreme Court, this analysis tends to emphasize the market in a rather
simplistic manner, forgetting that prestige and control of one's work
might actually be the commodity that academics are interested in.' 25 If
the Eleventh Circuit was to accept such an innovative argument, it
would create interesting precedent indeed, because it would put context
and nuance into an area that has generally tended to be binary, deeming
works either creative or factual.
Factor 3: The Good and Bad of the Bright-Line Rule. Additionally, the court of appeals will most likely address whether Judge Evans's
seemingly bright-line equation will be left to stand as a reasonable
guideline, or if it flies in the face of the Supreme Court's imperative to
avoid simplification of the fair use analysis through "bright-line
rules."'26 Of course, if the court of appeals were to deem the use
transformative, and thus expand Judge Evans's factor one analysis, the
amount of use would be irrelevant.12 7 Judge Evans asserted that the
factors were to be weighed as a whole; however, her numeric ratio is
what stands out in the holding of this case. In her opinion, she asserted
that if the defendants show they are a nonprofit educational institution
using the copies for nonprofit educational use, and if that use is limited
to 10% of a less-than-ten chapter book or one chapter of an over-ten
chapter book, that would favor fair use.'
This is especially true if a
license could not be reasonably and readily attained. Judge Evans's
emphasis on the quantity of the work used de-emphasizes what many
libraries and academics felt strongly weighed in their favor: the

125. For an interesting take on why and how academics publish, albeit in the context
of journals and not books, see Simon Owens, Is the Academic PublishingIndustry on the
Verge of Disruption?:As HarvardBalks at Subscription Cost and Others Take a Page from

Its Book, Open Access PublishersGet a Fresh Look, U.S. NEWS, July 23, 2012, availableat
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/07/23/is-the-academic-publshing-industry-on-

the-verge-of-disruption.
126. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
127. See Sag, supra note 117, at 84 (noting that the amount copied matters less, where
the use is transformative); see also Netanel, supra note 117, at 768 (2011) (concluding that
"the key question" is whether the use is transformative, and, if so, whether the amount
taken is appropriate to the transformative purpose); AV. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms,
LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 642 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting "use of plaintiffs' works was transformative
... [and] use of the entirety of plaintiffs' works did not preclude a finding of fair use");
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining that
copying of an entire image did not weigh against the defendant's claim of fair use).
128. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1232-35.
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preamble of § 107, along with transformative use.'29 The rule gives a
roadmap for libraries attempting to create checklists and guidelines for
their professors posting on e-reserves. However, it is not ideal, and most
libraries would prefer a flexible standard and, if possible, a sanctioning
by the Eleventh Circuit of the test mentioned in Cambridge, a use that
is narrowly tailored for its intended purpose, but without the numeric
bright-line ratio actually held by the court. 130 What frustrated both
the libraries and the publishers, but for different reasons, was that the
court threw out the Classroom Guidelines, strongly advocated by the
plaintiffs, as not comporting with the goals of fair use, while simultaneously instituting only a slightly higher amount of use in the brightline ratio.' 3 ' The future consequences are that anything over the
bright-line will heavily favor publishers, and publishers are worried that
the line is too high to ever develop a profitable digital licensing scheme.
It is unlikely, given the Supreme Court precedent, that the court of
appeals will maintain this hard-line ratio. However, if they do, they will
need to more meaningfully equilibrate its weight in relationship to the
other factors than the lower court did in order to stay within the Court's
directive on avoiding bright-line rules.
Recent studies have noted
Factor 4: What Market, What Money?
that although the first and third factor weigh heavily in a finding of fair
use, the court's rhetoric often emphasizes the fourth factor's market
effect analysis. 132 Again, Judge Evans seemed to take a traditional
approach, asking the plaintiffs- where is the market, and what is the

129. Prior to Cambridge, many libraries thought that the amount of use was dependent
on what was necessary. Thus, libraries reasoned that as long as their use was limited to
an intended educational purpose-in other words, if it was necessary to use a substantial
portion or even the whole work for a class-the copy would be valid fair use. See Code of
Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries, ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH
LIBRARIES.ORG. (Jan. 2012), http//www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyrightcodefairusecodetindex.shtml.
130. See Smith, supra note 117 (advocating that on appeal the GSU lawyers should

push for an analysis that would emphasize the transformative nature of the use and avoid
a bright-line ratio); HathiTrust,2012 WL 4808939, at *12 (advocating a test that focuses
on whether "copying was reasonable in relation to the purpose").
131. Although the plaintiffs were unhappy with what they considered to be a high ratio
of fair use copying, they would likely prefer it to stand over the transformative analysis
advocated by the libraries and Judge Baer's opinion in HathiTrust. See supra note 118.
132. Some scholars have argued that market effect is an allusive factor that "seems"
to have powerful bearing on the analysis, but, in reality, is a secondary factor to the
primary findings of transformation, creative shift, and amount copied. See Sag, supra note

117, at 64-65 (noting that the fourth factor "is no factor at all"); see also Barton Beebe, An
EmpiricalStudy of U.S. Copyright FairUse Opinions, 1978-2005,156 PA. L. REV. 549,62021 (2008) (reaching the same conclusion).
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monetary effect? Although recent cases have found that associations
133
lack standing to bring suit for violations of their member's copyright,
Judge Evans dealt with this in her prima facie analysis of the claims
and in her factor four analysis. She noted that where there was no
evidence of ownership, there was no obvious or tangible market
effect.'3 Judge Evans's market-focused analysis will likely be a major
subject for the court of appeals; however, it still remains to be seen if the
court will agree with it. The lower court emphasized that the lack of
pecuniary interest and market effect of an e-reserve database weighed
in favor of the defendants. In fact, Judge Evans's entire decision seemed
informed by the overarching question of what the license companies have
to gain from the litigation with such a small amount of profit at
stake. 35 The court noted the revenue from the licenses was at most
$100,000, a mere fraction of its overall revenue of millions. 3 Thus,
the court found that the e-reserve had little effect in the past and was
thus unlikely to affect the market in the future.'37 Furthermore, the
court reasoned that excerpts could never supplant a whole text, and yet,
here the court might have overlooked the fact that access to excerpts
would mean that students would likely never purchase the books in
which the excerpts were found."' However, the court did not look at
this point and focused instead on the question of licenses. 39 The court
did emphasize that licenses, where reasonably available, should be
attained. 4 ' However, this is surprisingly counterintuitive to the fair
use analysis, because fair use is in itself a reason not to pay, rather than

133. See supra note 109.
134. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-39.
135. Schechter, supra note 2, at § 10.2 (noting issues of "double counting" in the fair
use factor analysis).
136. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-40.
137. Id.
138. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that free, unauthorized downloading of music meant that the albums would never
be purchased from the license holders, and responding to the claim that the record

companies lacked an online presence, by noting that the "lack of harm to an established
market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop alternative markets for
the works").
139. The court did note that the costs of obtaining licenses would increase financial
burden placed on libraries and one that would likely be passed on to the students in their
tuition. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. Although the court did not argue this,
educational expense could be seen as a direct effect on the raison d'etre of copyright-the
promotion of continued growth of knowledge.
140. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
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The court of appeals could
a question of what is reasonable to pay.
determine that with growth in the academic marketplace, if universities
were not required to purchase licenses, there could be a valid claim by
the plaintiffs of potential cumulative effect, a point that the lower court
readily dismissed.
Finally, it seems that the licensing houses are determined to have
universities buy their licenses for their e-reserve databases because they
42
Regardless of
see this as imperative in a growing digital market.'
how this case is ultimately decided by the Eleventh Circuit, one thing is
certain: Cambridge is an important case guiding libraries, universities,
and publishers in their approach to copyright in the digital age.
Universities might want to spruce up their copyright policies, force their
professors to comply, and send some funding to their libraries, because
no matter what the court of appeals decides, one thing is clear: the
license companies want to be paid and they are willing to take your
school to court to do so.
JENNIFER FINDLEY

141. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10.10, at 439 (3ded.
1999).
142. Press release, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Cambridge University Press
Responds to US Ruling on Infringement Case (May 15, 2012), http://www.cambridge.org/
(asserting that GSU's "conduct
home/news/articleitem6922725/?sitelocale=enUS
amounted to systematic and industrial-scale unauthorized reproduction of our authors'
works. Such large-scale use cannot, in our view, be held to be Tair'"); Press Release, SAGE
PUBLICATIONS, In Regard to the Georgia State Copyright Decision (May 14, 2012),
http.//www.sagepub.com/press/20121may/SAGE-InRegardGeorgiaStateCopyrightDecision sP;
Press Release, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Response to Georgia State University Ruling
(May 14, 2012), http'//global.oup.comlnews-items/archive/OUPGSU?cc=us.

